

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]	25X1A
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SOURCE:

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1. Immediately following Stalin's death, there was cooperation between G.M. Malenkov and Beriya, based on the containment of the aggressive V.M. Molotov-Soviet Army group. In March, Beriya made the following concessions to Malenkov's new course of action:
 - a. The release of the Kremlin doctors.
 - b. The arrest of S.D. Ignatyev and Ryumin.¹
 - c. The amnesty in the USSR.
 - d. A conciliatory foreign policy.
2. Events during the months following Stalin's death indicated to Beriya that Malenkov was not satisfied with the limited concessions mentioned above and that he intended to carry out innovations which would be tantamount to altering the basic structure of the Stalinist system. As a result, the friction between Beriya and Malenkov grew, ending finally in the elimination of Beriya. The following events are those which culminated in Beriya's fall:
 - a. 16 April 1953 - L. Slepov's article in Pravda on collective leadership (seen as a challenge to Stalinism).

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- b. May 1953 - Malenkov called for collective leadership in the kolkhozy (seen as further change in the Stalinist system).
 - c. May 1953 - Malenkov forced the removal of seven out of 16 SSR Ministers favorable to Beriya (thus weakening Beriya's position).²
 - d. 9 June 1953 - Malenkov forced through a complete about-face in the German Democratic Republic.
 - e. 10 June 1953 - Beriya mentioned for the last time in the Soviet press.
 - f. 17 June 1953 - Uprisings in the German Democratic Republic (possibly cited by Beriya as proof that the new course was not operative, whereupon he threatened to withdraw his support; Malenkov then moved his prepared forces and eliminated Beriya).
 - g. 27 June 1953 - Beriya was absent from the Bolshoy Theater.
 - h. 10 July 1953 - Pravda editorial disclosed Beriya's arrest.
3. With the Beriya-MVD obstacle removed, Malenkov stepped up the implementation of his new policy as follows:
- a. The extensive internal concessions outlined in the 14-point program of the Ukrainian Communist Party.
 - b. The concessions to the Hungarian and Rumanian populations.
 - c. The continuation of the new course in Germany, despite the 17 June riots.
4. Further evidence of Malenkov's intention to continue the new course can be found in the 10 July Pravda editorial. Except for the ritualistic, Stalin-type accusations of "capitalist agent" etc., the editorial is a fervent re-statement of the new course. The accusations against Beriya cover mainly his attempts to prevent the implementation of Malenkov's policy. These attempts were:
- a. The frustrating of the implementation of collective leadership in the kolkhozy.
 - b. The sabotage of the new course by lawless and arbitrary acts (secret police methods).
 - c. The placing of the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the Communist Party (first official statement that the MVD is subordinate to the Party).
5. The Pravda editorial contains the strongest statement made to date of the collective leadership policy. [REDACTED] is Malenkov's term for his attempt to loosen the strictly dictatorial Stalinist system in the Party, economic, and agricultural spheres. The editorial also is a re-statement of Malenkov's foreign policy objective, which is peaceful cooperation with all nations. 25X1A
6. [REDACTED] the new course will continue for the reasons given

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in paragraphs 3 through 5 above. Possible dangers to this continuance are the rebellion of the Molotov-Army group or the opposition of the regional and district Stalinist functionaries who are now going to be purged and who will lose their former almost unlimited powers and privileges. Malenkov may be in the precarious position of losing the support of the middle functionaries before he has had time to consolidate his own group and to gain the support of the masses.³

- 25X1A 1. [REDACTED] Comment. On 6 and 7 April 1953, Ryumin was arrested and Ignatyev was relieved of his duties as Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It is probable that Ignatyev was also relieved of his membership in the Central Committee and subsequently arrested for his complicity in Ryumin's activities, but this has not been announced.

- 25X1A 2. [REDACTED] Comment. In the original [REDACTED] this sentence incorrectly 25X1A read "Malenkov forced removal of 16 SSR Ministers"; this should be changed to read "Malenkov forced removal of 7 out of 16 SSR Ministers".

It is assumed here that source is referring to the MVD and MGB and their consolidation on the republic level in April under the new MVD, following the model set up on the USSR level after the death of Stalin. It is true that, in seven out of the 11 republics on which reports were received, the head of the new MVD was the former MGB chief. There is no reason to believe, however, that the new appointees were Malenkov, rather than Beriya, supporters. 25X1A

- 25X1A 3. [REDACTED] Comment. For a previous interpretation, [REDACTED] 25X1A of the power struggle in the Kremlin, [REDACTED]

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